What is the test for admissible evidence of an uncharged crime?

"'Evidence of uncharged crimes is admissible to prove identity, common design or plan, or intent only if the charged and uncharged crimes are sufficiently similar to support a rational inference of identity, common design or plan, or intent. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1328.) "When the prosecution seeks to prove the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the charged offense with evidence he had committed uncharged offenses, the admissibility of evidence of the uncharged offenses turns on proof that the charged and uncharged offenses share sufficient distinctive common features to raise an inference of identity. A lesser degree of similarity is required to establish the existence of a common plan or scheme and still less similarity is required to establish intent. [Citations.] In order to be admissible to prove intent, the uncharged misconduct must be sufficiently similar to the charged offense to support the inference that the defendant probably acted with the same intent in each instance. [Citations.] The decision whether to admit other crimes evidence rests within the discretion of the trial court. [Citation.]" (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 23.)

Appellant argues that the prior crime evidence was inadmissible because appellant conceded identity, intent, and plan to steal at trial. Appellant, however, pled not guilty to the robbery charge which put in issue all of the elements of the offense. (People v. Lindberg, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 23.) "Defendant argues that he conceded at trial the issue of

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intent . . . . Even if this is so, the prosecution is still entitled to prove its case and especially to prove a fact so central to the basic question of guilt as intent. [Citation.]" (People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1243.) The other crimes evidence was highly probative because appellant entered the same store, stole candy from the same aisle, and displayed a knife when confronted by the store manager. It was an Estes robbery in which appellant stole merchandise in the immediate presence of a store employee and used force and fear to complete the taking. (See People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23, 25-26.) The trial court reasonably concluded that the prior uncharged robbery was sufficiently similar to establish appellant's identity, intent, and plan to rob the store. (People v. Steele, supra, at p. 1243.)

Appellant argues that the other crimes evidence was prejudicial and cast appellant in a bad light. "The potential for such prejudice is 'decreased' when testimony describing the defendant's uncharged acts is 'no stronger and no more inflammatory than the testimony concerning the charged offenses.' [Citation.]" (People v. Eubanks (2011) 53 Cal.4th 110, 144.) That is the case here. The trial court gave a limiting instruction that the other crimes evidence could only be considered to show identity, intent, and common plan. (CALCRIM No. 375.) The jury was instructed not to consider the evidence for any other purpose or conclude that appellant "has a bad character or is disposed to commit crime." On review, it is presumed that the jury understood and followed the instruction. (People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 852.)

Finally, appellant contends that the trial court believed appellant had the propensity to steal and relied on his

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life experiences rather than the evidence. We reject the argument because the jury was the fact finder not the trial court. It was instructed not to let bias, sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion influence its decision. (CALCRIM No. 200.) It was instructed that the other crimes evidence "is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is guilty of Robbery as alleged in Count 1. The People must still prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt." (CALCRIM No. 375.) The evidence was overwhelming, and it is not reasonably probable that appellant would have obtained a more favorable verdict if the prior uncharged robbery was not received. (People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 603.)

The judgment is affirmed.