What is the test for a sole practitioner to be granted relief in a medical malpractice case?

While one's natural sympathies incline towards a sole practitioner who becomes disabled from illness, rendering him incapable of carrying on his normal practice, we are enjoined that the discretion in granting relief in this type of situation is not Ex gratia. (Benjamin v. Dalmo Mfg. Co. (1948) Supra, 31 Cal.2d 523, 526, 190 P.2d 593.) We, therefore, examine the nature of the illness as described and then consider if the illness was so disabling that the neglect consisted only of acts or omissions of a kind which a reasonably prudent sole practitioner caught in similar circumstances would commit. If the neglect consisted of both excusable and inexcusable acts or omissions, was it the excusable portion of [270 Cal.App.2d 287] the neglect or the inexcusable portion that caused the default?