What is the test for a "prior restraint" under a licensing statute?

"[W]hen a licensing statute vests unbridled discretion in a government official over whether to permit or deny expressive activity," it is "void on its face." Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co. , 486 U.S. 750, 75556, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988) (quoting Lovell v. Griffin , 303 U.S. 444, 45253, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938) ). "[I]n the area of free expression a licensing statute placing unbridled discretion in the hands of a government official or agency constitutes a prior restraint and may result in censorship." Id. at 757, 108 S.Ct. 2138 (citations omitted). It allows the government "substantial power to discriminate based on the content or viewpoint of speech by suppressing disfavored speech or disliked speakers." Id. at 759, 108 S.Ct. 2138.

"A person subject to a restraint ordinance may make a facial, First Amendment attack on that ordinance without ever applying for a permit because the threat of the prior restraint itself constitutes an actual injury." Get Outdoors II v. San Diego , 506 F.3d 886, 894 (9th Cir. 2007). A "prior restraint" exists when: (1) the ordinance vests unbridled discretion in the licensor; or (2) the ordinance does not impose adequate time limits on the relevant public officials. Id.