What is the test for a motion to dismiss an indictment for violation of the Speedy Trial Act?

We review de novo appellant's claim that the district court erred by denying his request to dismiss the indictment for violation of the Speedy Trial Act. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3161 et seq. (1988). See United States v. Wirsing, 867 F.2d 1227, 1229 (9th Cir.1989). Our task is made more difficult by the inability of the parties to agree on the proper approach to applying the Act and by the parties' own inconsistency in so doing. For example, appellant initially argues that the only error in the district court's calculation was in its failure to include the time from June 2, 1989 to June 20, 1989. In his reply brief, appellant then challenges virtually the entire method of calculating time includable under the Speedy Trial Act. For its part, appellee represented in the district court that 59 days of countable time had elapsed; in this court appellee contends that only 56 days had elapsed.