What is the test for a motion to change venue on the grounds of prejudicial publicity?

In approaching the motion to change venue on the ground of prejudicial pretrial publicity, we refer briefly to some of the principles established by the cases. A succinct statement of the criteria to be followed was stated by this court in Lansdown v. Superior Court (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 604, at page 609, 89 Cal.Rptr. 154, at page 157:

'The standard against which we measure the record is articulated in Fain v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.3d 46, 51, 84 Cal.Rptr. 135, 137, 465 P.2d 23, 25: 'In making that appraisal the courts must now apply the standard we adopted in Maine (v. Superior Court) (68 Cal.2d 375 at p. 383, 66 Cal.Rptr. (724) at p. 729, 438 P.2d (372) at p. 377): "A motion for change of venue or continuance shall be granted whenever it is determined that because of the dissemination of potentially prejudicial material, there is a Reasonable likelihood that in the absence of such relief, a fair trial cannot be had . . .. A showing of actual prejudice shall not be required.""

'Reasonable likelihood' of prejudice does not mean that prejudice must be 'more probable than not' (Frazier v. Superior Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 287, 294--295, 95 Cal.Rptr. 798, 486 P.2d 694).