What is the test for a motion for discovery of grand jury materials under the Speedy Trial Act?

Bellon argues the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for discovery of grand jury materials. We disagree because Bellon did not establish the requisite particularized need for the materials. See United States v. Ferreboeuf, 632 F.2d 832, 835 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 934 (1981).

Bellon argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the indictment because his trial began more than 70 days after his first appearance. The indictment was filed on July 9, 1993, Bellon first appeared on July 13, 1993, and he was arraigned on July 20, 1993. Between August 13, 1993 and February 15, 1994, Bellon filed numerous pretrial motions. The district court disposed of these motions on various dates, including the first day of trial. Any delay resulting from pretrial motions is automatically excluded. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3161(h)(1)(F); United States v. Baker, 10 F.3d 1374, 1400 (9th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 330 (1994). Once the time attributable to the motions is excluded, it is clear that the February 22, 1994 trial did not violate the Speedy Trial Act.