What is the test for a motion by a defendant to obtain a continuance to replace retained counsel at trial?

Given the state's countervailing interest in judicial efficiency, a trial court generally enjoys discretion in granting or denying a continuance to permit a defendant to be represented by retained counsel. (People v. Courts (1985) 37 Cal.3d 784, 790-791 (Courts).) In

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assessing whether the trial court's denial of a continuance amounts to an abuse of discretion, the reviewing court looks to the circumstances of each case, "'particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request [was] denied.' [Citations.]" (People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1118.) Where the defendant requests a continuance close to the date of trial, the lateness of the request may be a significant factor justifying denial absent compelling circumstances to the contrary. (Courts, supra, at p. 792, fn. 4 [eve-of-trial requests may be "a significant factor" justifying a denial where there are "no compelling circumstances to the contrary"].) Thus, a continuance may be denied where the defendant "is 'unjustifiably dilatory' in obtaining counsel" or "'arbitrarily chooses to substitute counsel at the time of trial.' [Citation.]" (Id. at pp. 790-791.)

Under the circumstances faced by the court in this case, we cannot say it abused its discretion in consistently denying the motion and requests for a continuance. The requests, by written and oral motion, were made on the day trial was set to commence. Each request was unjustifiably dilatory. (Courts, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 790-791.) Nothing in the record suggests defendant made a good faith or diligent effort to substitute retained counsel leading up to trial. Nor did defendant provide any compelling reason for waiting until the day of trialafter settlement negotiations had failedto ask to delay the trial to hire a different attorney, who himself suggested the substitution would cause additional delay and could lead to further plea negotiations. (See People v. Keshishian (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 425, 429 (Keshishian) [right to counsel "'"cannot mean a defendant may

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