What is the test for a mistake of fact defense in a sexual assault case?

In his version, defendant acknowledges he was not in the most levelheaded of mental states. But his self-diagnosed paranoia cannot be a factor in his favor. For 30 years it has been accepted that a defendant's subjective mental state operates only within the range of what is objectively reasonable. The defendant "must honestly believe the victim consented and that belief must be reasonable under the circumstances. [Citation.] Reasonableness, of course, is an objective standard. . . . For this reason, a mistake of fact defense cannot be predicated on delusions . . . ." (People v. Castillo (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 119, 124-125, italics added.)

Because we are required to view the evidence most favorably to the prosecution's evidence and the jury's verdict (People v. Jennings, supra, 50 Cal.4th 616, 638-639), we are compelled to conclude that the jury decided that, if defendant had a belief in the victim's consent, such a belief was not objectively reasonable. Defendant portrays his voice may have been "calm" and "non-threatening," but we must accept the jury crediting the victim's testimony that it was angry. Regardless of its tone or volume, defendant's voice was conveying orders and demanding obedience. The victim's terror, and the reason for it, cannot be erased from consideration. She was trapped, a prisoner in her own home, without means of escape.⁴ She was vulnerable.⁵ She was bleeding from repeated beatings, and had been subjected to demeaning humiliations. Her immediate fear for her own safety was a paralyzing reality. Her vicarious fear for her son and family was only slightly less stifling. As all of these emotions had been created by defendant, the jury could conclude that, as an objectively reasonable person, he could not claim to be unaware of them. As the person who had physically and mentally terrorized the victim

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