The following excerpt is from United States v. Egan, 459 F.2d 997 (2nd Cir. 1972):
The court's charge on willfulness was essentially correct. Appellant made a request to charge that, if the jury found that appellant did not file his returns for the years in question for fear of incriminating himself for previous violations, the jury must acquit. But this is no defense, United States v. Fullerton, 189 F.Supp. 211 (D.Md.1960), and the court gave the appellant all that, perhaps even more than, he was entitled to by saying that the jury should acquit if it found that appellant believed he had a constitutional right not to file tax returns.
Appellant's remaining argument concerns certain considerations stated by the court while rendering an otherwise perfectly proper sentence. "A sentencing judge has very broad discretion in imposing any sentence within the statutory limits . . .," United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d 181, 183 (2d Cir. 1972), and in the exercise of that discretion he may consider a wide range of data. See id. at 183-184 and cases there cited. The characterization of the crime of failing to file income tax returns as "acquisitive" may not have been totally accurate when, apparently, relatively small amounts of dollars were involved. But it is descriptive of the general type of crime as opposed to one of violence, drugs or the like, and the judge was expressing a perfectly proper philosophy of sentencing to the effect that this kind of crimesometimes called "white collar" or "commercial"should be treated just as seriously as some of the so-called "ghetto" crimes. Taking note of the defense of self-incrimination as having "come up very late in the game" was supported factually in the record and did not refer to trial tactics, but to appellant's previous explanations for his failure to file.
Judgment affirmed.
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