California, United States of America
The following excerpt is from People v. Parker, B247064 (Cal. App. 2014):
"Intervening causes in criminal cases are typically described as either 'dependent' or 'independent.' A dependent intervening cause will not absolve a defendant of criminal liability while an independent intervening cause breaks the chain of causation and does absolve the defendant. [Citation.] 'An intervening cause may be a normal or involuntary result of the defendant's original act. Such a cause is said to be "dependent," and does not supersede; i.e., the defendant is liable just as in the direct causation case.' [Citation.] An 'independent' intervening 'act may be so disconnected and unforeseeable as to be a superseding cause; i.e., in such a case the defendant's act will be a remote, and not the proximate, cause.' [Citation.]" (People v. Schmies (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 38, 48, fn. omitted.) In terms of a foreseeable intervening cause, "'"'The precise consequence need not have been foreseen; it is enough that the defendant should have foreseen the possibility of some harm of the kind which might result from his act.' [Citation.]" [Citation.]' [Citations.]" (People v. Cervantes (2001) 26 Cal.4th 860, 871.)
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