What is the test for a finding that a grand jury's decision to destroy or otherwise destroy evidence against appellant was flawed?

Balancing the relevant considerations, appellant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated, see Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-33 (1972); and appellant failed to make the showing of bad faith required to establish the destruction of evidence violated due process. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 109 S.Ct. 333, 337 (1988).

(5) Since appellant's conviction by the petit jury was supported by substantial evidence, any infirmity in the grand jury's charging decision was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 70 (1986); United States v. Tobias, 836 F.2d 449, 452 (9th Cir.1988).

(6) The essence of the instruction sought by appellant was given. The trial court merely exercised its "substantial latitude in tailoring the instructions." United States v. Burgess, 791 F.2d 676, 680 (9th Cir.1986).