California, United States of America
The following excerpt is from People v. Rangel, G046590 (Cal. App. 2013):
Under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, "[a] person who knowingly aids and abets criminal conduct is guilty of not only the intended crime but also of any other crime the perpetrator actually commits that is a natural and probable consequence of the intended crime. The latter question is not whether the aider and abettor actually foresaw the additional crime, but whether, judged objectively, it was reasonably foreseeable." (People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1133.) "For a criminal act to be a 'reasonably foreseeable' or a 'natural and probable' consequence of
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another criminal design it is not necessary that the collateral act be specifically planned or agreed upon, nor even that it be substantially certain to result from the commission of the planned act." (People v. Nguyen (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 530.) But "the collateral criminal act [must be] the ordinary and probable effect of the common design," rather than "a fresh and independent product of the mind of one of the participants, outside of, or foreign to, the common design." (Id. at p. 531.) The issue "is a factual question to be resolved by the jury in light of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident." (Ibid.)
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