What is the test for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel?

Appellant counters that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the statements. "To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Counsel's performance was deficient if the representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Prejudice exists where there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." (Citations omitted.) (People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 92-93.)

Appellant argues his counsel was ineffective as there was no reason not to object to the misstatements. However, "the mere failure to object rarely rises to a level implicating one's constitutional right to effective legal counsel." (People v. Boyette

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(2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 433.) In addition, "except in those rare instances where there is no conceivable tactical purpose for counsel's actions, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should be raised on habeas corpus, not on direct appeal. This is particularly true where, as here, the alleged incompetence stems from counsel's failure to object. '[D]eciding whether to object is inherently tactical, and the failure to object will rarely establish ineffective assistance.'" (Citation omitted.) (People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 972; see also People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 700-701 [An appellate court will reject a claim of ineffective assistance unless there can be no satisfactory explanation for the challenged behavior.].)

In People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 326-331, the court held that the concept of transferred intent did not apply to attempted murder, which sanctioned what a person intended to do, but did not accomplish, not unintended and unaccomplished potential consequences. The court noted, "To be guilty of attempted murder, the defendant must intend to kill the alleged victim, not someone else." (Id. at p. 328.) The court reasoned that the fact a person desired to kill a particular target, did not preclude a finding that the person also, concurrently, intended to kill others within the "kill zone." (Id. at pp. 329-331.) "'The intent is concurrent . . . when the nature and scope of the attack, while directed at a primary victim, are such that we can conclude the perpetrator intended to ensure harm to the primary victim by harming everyone in that victim's vicinity.'" (Id., at p. 329; see also People v. Stone (2009) 46 Cal.4th 131, 136-138.)