What is the state of the law on next-friend standing in the context of habeas corpus?

The speed with which we act has prevented us from developing a coherent body of habeas corpus law. We do not pause to give rigorous intellectual examination to the positions we take and are deprived of the opportunity for the thoughtful and reasoned exchanges of views that are so essential to proper judicial decisionmaking. It is the subjecting of ideas to careful analysis by others that frequently forges opinions that result in positive and creative advances in the law. Instead, in the habeas corpus area, we end up with serious gaps in our jurisprudence and, often, with decisions that are logically flawed. None of our cases addresses the critical question of what constitutes a "full and fair" state-court hearing within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254. See, e.g., Richmond v. Ricketts, 774 F.2d 957, 961-62 (9th Cir.1985). Other critical questions have been similarly ignored. For example, how can a next-friend petitioner ever present "meaningful evidence" of a defendant's incompetency to a district court if he lacks standing to request medical examinations or to cross-examine witnesses in the first place? In short, I believe that because of our emphasis on speed over substance, our entire body of next-friend standing law is badly underreasoned and underdeveloped.