What is the standard of review for the prosecution in a case of aiding and abettor and conspirator liability?

[Citation.] [] The same standard of review applies to cases in which the prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial evidence and to special circumstance allegations. [Citation.] "[I]f the circumstances reasonably justify the jury's findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding." [Citation.] We do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a witness's credibility. [Citation.]'" (People v. Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 210 [internal quotation marks omitted].)

"Conflicts and even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends. [Citation.]" (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403.)

b. Aider and abettor and conspirator liability

"[A]n aider and abettor is a person who, 'acting with (1) knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator; and (2) the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense, (3) by act or advice aids, promotes, encourages, or instigates, the commission of the crime.'" (People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 259.) "'[An aider and abettor] is guilty not only of the offense he intended to facilitate or encourage, but also of any reasonably foreseeable offense committed by the person he aids and abets. . . .'" (Id. at p. 261.)

Mere presence at the scene of a crime and even knowledge that a crime is being committed are not sufficient to prove aiding and abetting. (People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 409.) However, factors such as presence at the scene of the crime, companionship with the perpetrators, and conduct before and after the offense may circumstantially prove aiding and abetting. (Ibid.)