What is the standard of review applied in a death penalty case?

Defendants initially contend that because they have been sentenced to death, we are required by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution to apply a "heightened" standard of review to their claims, rather than the standard we routinely apply in both capital and noncapital cases, which is "review [of] the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt" (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1212), "presum[ing] in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence" (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053).¹⁹ Defendants are mistaken. As the United States Supreme Court has held in a similar context, "the standard of federal [constitutional] review for determining whether a state court has violated the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee against wholly arbitrary deprivations of liberty is equally applicable in safeguarding the Eighth Amendment's bedrock guarantee against the arbitrary or capricious imposition of the death penalty." (Lewis v. Jeffers

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(1990) 497 U.S. 764, 782 [applying the standard established in Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, to federal constitutional review of the state court's finding of an aggravating circumstance in a capital case].) As the high court observed in Jeffers, the application of the facts to the law at a state court trial that is, the determination of whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the charges is a question of state law, except to the extent that the determination of sufficiency at issue was arbitrary or capricious under the federal due process or cruel and unusual punishment clauses. The application of state law in determining the sufficiency of the evidence will be considered arbitrary and capricious, and therefore a federal constitutional violation, "if and only if no reasonable sentencer [or factfinder] could have so concluded." (Jeffers, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 783.) Accordingly, we apply the standard of review set forth above to ensure that defendants' state and federal rights are protected.

We also observe that for the most part, defendants dispute the persuasive value of the evidence that was admitted against them, pointing to various inconsistencies and inadequacies in the testimony of several witnesses and the physical evidence. In our limited role on appeal, "[c]onflicts and even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends. [Citation.] We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial evidence." (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403.) Further, "if the circumstances reasonably justify the jury's findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding." (People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 143.) Accordingly, we need not and do not address all of defendants' assertions of conflicts in the evidence, or their alternative theories regarding the inferences that should have been drawn from the evidence.

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