The following excerpt is from Barnard v. United States, 342 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1965):
The court quotes its opinion in Kaplan v. United States, 329 F.2d 561, 563, wherein the standard to be applied by the
[342 F.2d 323]
court in reviewing the evidence of a conviction in a criminal case is said to be "whether `reasonable minds could find that the evidence excludes every hypothesis but that of guilt.'" This means, of course, that the court assumes the task of appraising and weighing the evidence, as judges, and with the wisdom and experience of judges. It does not mean that the judges should try to assume the posture of lay jurors exposed to the conflicts and confusions of a long-drawn conspiracy trial of ten defendants, and to determine what mistakes on the part of the jury might be reasonably excusable in those circumstances. The judges are not exposed to those conflicts and confusions. They have the opportunity and the duty, in the course of a deliberate review of the evidence, to determine what part of the evidence has relevance to the charges against this one or that one or more of the ten defendants on trial in a case such as the instant one. Mr. Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion in the case of Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 454, 69 S.Ct. 716, 723, 93 L.Ed. 790 said:[342 F.2d 323]
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