What is the impact of the majority's exclusionary rule in the context of criminal sentencing?

While this might be a good rule to encourage the government to present a complete record supporting its desired sentence, Maj. Op. at 1258, I am not convinced that we must establish prophylactic rules for the Department of Justice at the expense of a fully informed determination of the appropriate sentence for defendants. Like the exclusionary rule in the Fourth Amendment context, the majority's prophylactic rule will generate[ ] substantial social costs, including setting shorter sentences for dangerous convicted felons on the basis of incomplete evidence. See Hudson v. Michigan , 547 U.S. 586, 591, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Given the rule's costly toll upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives, we should be more cautious in establishing and applying it. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. (Suppression of evidence ... has always been our last resort, not our first impulse.).

The process of criminal sentencing is not a game between the government and criminal defendants, in which one side or the other gets penalized for unskillful play. The goal of sentencing is to determine the most appropriate sentence in light of the characteristics of the crime and the defendant. United States v. Matthews , 240 F.3d 806, 823 (9th Cir. 2000) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting), on reh'g en banc , 278 F.3d 880 (9th Cir. 2002). Unfortunately, the majority loses sight of these principles and seeks to penalize the government to satisfy its own conception of justice.

I respectfully dissent.