What is the general rule against vacating a final judgment or order or order based on intrinsic fraud?

any fraud attempted by his adversary. [Citations.]" (Kulchar v. Kulchar (1969) 1 Cal.3d 467, 472.) The general rule against vacating a final judgment or order based on intrinsic fraud has been applied even where there was not a fully litigated trial.

In Beresh v. Sovereign Life Ins. Co. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 547 (Beresh), more than six months after the trial court had granted summary judgments in favor of the respondents and the expiration of the six-month statutory period for filing a section 473 motion for relief, the appellants filed a motion to vacate the summary judgments on the ground that they had been obtained through false affidavits. (Beresh, supra, at pp. 551-554.) Appellants' motion to vacate was "based primarily on the power of the court to grant equitable relief from a judgment procured by extrinsic fraud" (id. at p. 553). The alleged fraud consisted of " 'deliberate, intentional misrepresentations, untruths, half truths [sic], and deceitfully misleading affidavits, arguments and declarations.' " (Ibid., fn. omitted.) The appellate court concluded that trial court properly denied the motion to vacate because the appellants had "not shown that the summary judgments were procured by extrinsic fraud" and had not filed their motion "within the six-month time limitation of section 473." (Id. at p. 554.)