What is the evidence supporting appellant's claim that her Fifth Amendment privilege does not waiver?

We find two flaws in appellant's theory. First, the record does not show a firm, unequivocal ruling by the trial court which appellant justifiably could have relied upon in believing that her Fifth Amendment privilege was not subject to waiver. During a special hearing on the voluntariness of certain of appellant's statements, the trial judge did misrepresent or ignore the controlling case law, see Brown v. United States, supra, by stating his belief that a defendant never waives his privilege against self-incrimination by taking the witness stand. ⁸ Although the court's statement was somewhat confusing and misleading, appellant could not reasonably have believed that this pronouncement, given in the very limited context of a voluntariness hearing, was a promise to her that she could testify on the merits during the trial without subjecting herself to cross-examination or comment upon her refusal to answer

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