What is the effect of the vicarious exclusionary rule on police misconduct in search and seizure cases?

The dissent correctly observes that this court has long considered the exclusionary rule to be the only effective means of deterring police misconduct in violation of the search and seizure provisions of the federal or state Constitutions. (People v. Cahan, supra, 44 Cal.2d 434, 447, 282 P.2d 905.) We have described the rule as being "required in order to give substance to the rights conferred" by those provisions (People v. Reeves (1964) 61 Cal.2d 268, 275, 38 Cal.Rptr. 1, 391 P.2d 393), and the vicarious exclusionary rule as a "necessary adjunct" to it. (Kaplan v. Superior Court, supra, 6 Cal.3d 150, 161, 98 Cal.Rptr. 649, 491 P.2d 1.) The fact remains, however, that both rules are of judicial creation, and relate to remedy rather than the scope of substantive rights protected by either Constitution. The people have apparently decided that the exclusion of evidence is not an acceptable means of implementing those rights, except as required by the Constitution of

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