What is the effect of the trial court's error in not allowing defense counsel to participate in the evidentiary and closing statements?

Applying the Chapman standard here, we find the trial court's errors to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. First, the subsequent evidentiary [14 Cal.App.4th 1831] hearing, even though untimely, preserved for the record the reasons why the deputies felt that physical restraints were necessary. Some of these reasons were substantial reasons, even if others were insubstantial. (Cf. People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d 618, 651-652, 280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351.)

Second, it appears that only unobtrusive leg restraints were used. Although the record is unclear regarding the extent to which the jury actually saw defendants in physical restraints, and the type of restraints used, it was possible for the jury to do so. (See fn. 8, supra; People v. Tuilaepa, supra, 4 Cal.4th 569, 584, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142.) During the viewing of the vehicles, the trial court took steps to minimize the possibility that the jury would see the restraints.

Third, we give some weight to the trial court's later statements that it was aware of the measures being taken by security personnel from the outset, and that it made a determination that the prosecution had made an adequate showing of threatened violence. Nevertheless, the trial court failed to allow defense counsel to participate in that determination, and failed to state the information which was the alleged basis for its decision. Although one deputy testified that the crimes themselves were relevant to show a threat of violence against law enforcement officers, that is not enough. The relevant conduct is defendant's conduct in custody. (People v. Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1263, 232 Cal.Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115; People v. Jacla, supra, 77 Cal.App.3d 878, 883-884, 144 Cal.Rptr. 23.)