What is the effect of the prosecutor's argument to the jury in the context of provocation?

The court found "[t]he prosecutor's jury argument arguably approached the improper argument condemned in People v. Najera (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 212," namely, " ' "Would a reasonable person do what the defendant did? Would a reasonable person be so aroused as to kill somebody? That's the standard." ' " (Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 954, fn. 15.) The court concluded the prosecutor's jury argument "may have confused the jury's understanding of the court's instructions" by "creat[ing] an ambiguity about the nature of sufficient provocation . . . ." (Id. at pp. 955, 956.)

Having so concluded, the Beltran court considered whether the potential ambiguity created by the prosecutor's argument prejudiced the defendant. (Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 955-957.) Applying the harmless error standard articulated in People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, the court concluded "[i]t was not reasonably probable that the jury . . . was misled to defendant's detriment." (Beltran,

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