What is the effect of the majority's rule requiring a jury to introduce new scientific principles by instruction?

It is unclear, for instance, whether the majority's reasoning extends to similar jury charges, thereby mandating the introduction of other scientific principles by instruction regardless of whether those principles are implicated at trial. The majority's rule also threatens the viability of expert testimony on the cross-race effect, which is permissible only where the topic is "beyond the ken of the average juror" ( People v. Abney, 13 N.Y.3d 251, 268, 889 N.Y.S.2d 890, 918 N.E.2d 486 [2009] )not where it is "a matter of common sense and experience" (majority op. at 529, 69 N.Y.S.3d at 220, 91 N.E.3d at 1199). A mandatory rule also spawns retroactivity issues, which carry serious and sweeping implications. These ramifications, among others, highlight both the weight and breadth of such a sharp divergence from recent precedent.