What is the effect of the court's comment on defendant's testimony that there is a reasonable probability the jury can agree on a verdict?

We also disagree with defendant's contention that the court's order declaring a recess until the following morning, once it had ascertained the vote was split, implied the court had found "something wrong" with the vote which might be remedied by a night's rest. The determination, pursuant to section 1140, whether there is a " 'reasonable probability' " of agreement, rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. (People v. Miller (1990) 50 Cal.3d 954, 994, 269 Cal.Rptr. 492, 790 P.2d 1289.) Although the court must take care to exercise its power without coercing the jury into abdicating its independent judgment in favor of considerations of compromise and expediency (ibid.), the court may direct further deliberations upon its reasonable conclusion that such direction would be perceived " 'as a means of enabling the jurors to enhance their understanding of the case rather than as mere pressure to reach a verdict on the basis of matters already discussed and considered.' [Citation.]" (Ibid.) Nothing in the trial court's comment in the present case properly may be construed as an attempt to pressure the jury to reach a verdict; the court correctly concluded there was a reasonable probability the jurors could agree on a verdict.

3. The trial court's comments on defendant's testimony.