What is the effect of prejudicial evidence on a jury's consideration of a defendant's motive?

^6. In People v. Gibson, supra, 56 Cal.App.3d 119, the appellate court reversed a judgment convicting the defendant of second degree murder on several grounds, including that the prejudicial effect of other crimes evidence admitted to show motivein a case where the defendant's commission of the charged murder was disputedoutweighed its probative value. (Id. at pp. 129-130.) The court observed that other crimes evidence admitted to prove motive was "much closer to its use as character trait evidence than when it is offered solely to prove defendant's intent. In terms of prejudicial consequence, there is very little difference, however, between other-crimes evidence that is introduced to establish a defendant's motive and thence to the inference that the charged offense was committed by defendant in accordance with such motive, and other-crimes evidence as character trait evidence that leads to the same inferencethat a defendant acted in accordance with such character trait and committed the charged offense." (Ibid.) The court stated: "It is the essence of sophistry and lack of realism to think that an instruction or admonition to a jury to limit its consideration of highly prejudicial evidence to its limited relevant purpose can have any realistic effect. . . . We live in a dream world if we believe that jurors are capable of hearing such prejudicial evidence but not applying it in an improper manner. [] . . . The expectation that the jury could limit its use of such evidence as circumstantial evidence of defendant's intent and motive, after applying other evidence in the case to reject defendant's alibi defense in accordance with the court's limiting instructions and admonitions, is indeed an exercise in futility and illusory imagery." (Id. at p. 130.)