What is the effect of disqualifying a district attorney for misconduct?

We hold further that, even if the power to disqualify existed, that power was here abused. The drastic remedy of disqualification is by no means necessary to protection of the rights of a defendant in a criminal case. The broad panoply of his rights is familiar to all who read the appellate decisions in criminal cases. Our adversary system requires that a district attorney be vigorous in the prosecution of crime, but the applicable rules require fixed restraints upon his conduct. Every court has the inherent power to regulate the proceedings and to control the conduct of all persons connected with a judicial matter before it. (Code Civ.Proc., 128; People v. Miller, supra, 185 Cal.App.2d 59, 77, 8 Cal.Rptr. 91.) Alerted as it is to whatever possibility there is of over-avidity, the trial court has adequate means of effective control. Here, the sole asserted incentive to misconduct is the presence of one minor clerical employee in a large office staff. That connection is too tenuous and remote to support the wholly speculative theory that it will induce the prosecution to risk trial court sanctions and appellate reversal. We find it quite as difficult to disqualify a prosecutor because he seeks conviction as we would to disqualify defense counsel because he vigorously seeks acquittal. To open either avenue would but lead to the mischief and injustice of delay. Upon the facts here, we hold that discretion, even if it existed, was abused.