What is the effect of a substitution of attorney on a motion for defendants' fees?

Here, no prejudice exists and indeed plaintiff does not attempt to argue it was prejudiced or misled. "The main purpose of a substitution of attorneys is that both the court and opposing counsel may know that they are dealing with an attorney who has power to bind the party he purports to represent." (Carrara v. Carrara, supra, 121 Cal.App.2d at p. 62.) We take judicial notice of the contents of the record from the earlier appeal in case No. B184027. (Evid. Code, 452, subd. (d).) That record shows that defendants filed a formal substitution of attorney in this court that substituted Bramzon into this case on March 24, 2006. Subsequently, Bramzon authored the July 2006 respondent's brief on behalf of defendants. Likewise, Bramzon argued the case before this court in 2006. Thus, plaintiff was quite aware of Bramzon's authority to represent defendants and manifestly could not be prejudiced by the arrival in the trial court of Bramzon's motion for attorney fees under the contract. In fact, the trial court suspected Bramzon properly appeared. It stated, "Don't think I'm accusing you of coming in to handle the case without any knowledge or consent of the person who you say is your client. I'm not concerned about that." Hence, a formal substitution of counsel filed in connection with the attorney's fee motion would not have provided any additional notice.

In the absence of prejudice here, the trial court manifestly abused its discretion in denying defendants' fee motion because (1) plaintiff was not prejudiced, (2) a substitution of attorney was filed in this court before Bramzon sought fees in the trial court, (3) Bramzon's name appears on the appellate court's opinion as counsel of record for defendants, and (4) the lease provided for attorney's fees to be paid to defendants, not their attorney. "[I]t is better to dispose of ` ". . . causes upon their substantial merits, rather than with strict regard to technical rules of procedure. The discretion of the court ought always to be exercised in such manner as will subserve rather than impede or defeat the ends of justice." ' [Citation.]" (Carrara v. Carrara, supra, 121 Cal.App.2d at p. 63.)