What is the effect of a motion to dismiss a charge under section 1382 of the Penal Code?

On April 8, 1974, a pretrial hearing was held and trial was set for April 15, 1974. The following day appellant filed notice of a motion to dismiss [45 Cal.App.3d 114] the action pursuant to subdivision 3 of section 1382 of the Penal Code. The motion was denied. Appellant then challenged the order of denial by filing a petition for a writ of mandate, contending under Cody v. Justice Court (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 275, 47 Cal.Rptr. 716 that he had not been brought to trial within the 45-day period specified in subdivision 3 of section 1382 of the Penal Code, which period had commenced to run anew on February 22, 1974 (the date that the motion for change of venue had been granted.) The

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In Cody v. Justice Court, Supra, the defendant was arrested and charged on April 14, 1964. Trial was set for June 25, 1974, and was ultimately continued to November 17, 1974, by stipulation of the parties. On November 5 the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the action and a motion to change venue, with the latter being granted. Trial was set in the second forum for January 14, 1965. On December 22, 1964, the defendant again moved to dismiss the action on the ground that he had not been brought to trial within the time specified in subdivision 3 of section 1382. This motion and a subsequent petition for a writ of mandate were denied. At that time, subdivision 3 of section 1382 provided that a defendant in a misdemeanor case in an inferior court must be brought to trial within 30 days after his arrest. Although the case was ultimately decided on the issue of waiver, in reaching this issue the court held that when a motion for change of venue was granted the 30-day period began to run anew in the second forum as of the date that the order changing venue was granted. The court adopted the uniform rule followed in other jurisdictions that where a defendant's motion for change of venue is granted, the statutory time for bringing him to trial is reinstated and the delay caused by such motion cannot be charged to the prosecution.