What is the difference between a state and a judicially-crafted search rule?

3. Defendant picks up on the fact that this rule was created by the state courts and stresses that "the search [in this case] was not done pursuant to any state regulation." The Griffin opinion, however, draws no such distinction between legislatively- and judicially-crafted rules. See United States v. Giannetta, 909 F.2d 571, 575 (1st Cir. 1990) ("[W]e do not read Griffin as approving only probation searches conducted pursuant to a legislative or administrative framework."). Further, we can see no reason to distinguish between legislatively- and judicially-crafted search rules for these purposes. The critical question, for Fourth Amendment purposes, is whether the regulation contains a reasonableness requirement (or some more stringent standard); it is not which branch of Government generated the rule.

3. Defendant picks up on the fact that this rule was created by the state courts and stresses that "the search [in this case] was not done pursuant to any state regulation." The Griffin opinion, however, draws no such distinction between legislatively- and judicially-crafted rules. See United States v. Giannetta, 909 F.2d 571, 575 (1st Cir. 1990) ("[W]e do not read Griffin as approving only probation searches conducted pursuant to a legislative or administrative framework."). Further, we can see no reason to distinguish between legislatively- and judicially-crafted search rules for these purposes. The critical question, for Fourth Amendment purposes, is whether the regulation contains a reasonableness requirement (or some more stringent standard); it is not which branch of Government generated the rule.

4. Indeed, the New York rule is coextensive with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. A rule indicating that a search of a parolee is permissible so long as it is reasonably related to the parole officer's duties is identical to a rule that parole officers may conduct searches so long as they comport with the Fourth Amendment. This is because the doctrine of 'special needs,' Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313-14 (1997), permits those searches that are reasonably related to the special needs animated by management of a parole system.

4. Indeed, the New York rule is coextensive with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. A rule indicating that a search of a parolee is permissible so long as it is reasonably related to the parole officer's duties is identical to a rule that parole officers may conduct searches so long as they comport with the Fourth Amendment. This is because the doctrine of 'special needs,' Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313-14 (1997), permits those searches that are reasonably related to the special needs animated by management of a parole system.