California, United States of America
The following excerpt is from People v. Webster, 285 Cal.Rptr. 31, 54 Cal.3d 411, 814 P.2d 1273 (Cal. 1991):
[814 P.2d 1306] Recognizing this constitutional imperative, the court in People v. Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d 527, 557, 257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244, said "we believe that an intentional murder, committed under circumstances which include (1) a concealment of purpose, (2) a substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune time to act, and (3) immediately thereafter, a surprise attack on an unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage, presents a factual matrix sufficiently distinct from 'ordinary' premeditated murder to justify treating it as a special circumstance." But this analysis is inadequate. To be sure, a murder meeting these criteria is different from one that does not, as a murder in summer is different from one in winter. But to meet constitutional requirements, the difference must be such that murder while lying in wait deserves a punishment far more severe than an otherwise identical murder which does not involve lying in wait. Morales made no attempt to show that a murder by lying in wait is more heinous than an "ordinary" murder, or that the difference, if any, is sufficient to justify the disparity in penalty.
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