What is the difference between a defendant and Attorney General in a reply brief for an aggravated sexual assault charge?

⁴ For the first time in his reply brief, defendant argues that while he agrees "respondent's interpretation of the statutory scheme is plausible[,] ... it is not the only reasonable interpretation." Because there is no "existing case law" establishing the crimes of attempted assault or attempted aggravated sexual assault, and "by expressly identifying the crime of aggravated sexual assault of a child within Penal Code section 269," defendant claims "the statute should be interpreted to preclude an attempt." The failure to raise this argument in his opening brief forfeits defendant's ability to make the argument in reply because the Attorney General has no opportunity to respond. (People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 12181219, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 265, 367 P.3d 649.) And even if this argument had not been waived, it has no merit. Like aggravated sexual assault, the Penal Code also identifies the completed crimes of rape, sodomy, and oral copulation, but no case law has ever held that these crimes cannot be charged and proved as attempts. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we believe there is only one reasonable interpretation of section 269that is, attempted aggravated sexual assault is a crime.

^** See footnote *, ante .