The following excerpt is from Wurtz v. Risley, 719 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1983):
The offense presupposes a "demand" by the defendant, which means a communication in words or otherwise; and as a practical matter, if not as a logical necessity, the legislature no doubt also assumed that the impelling fear will be instilled by speech or its equivalent. If the victim acts in fearful anticipation without any demand, the definition of coercion is not met. The demand, the fear-instilling communication of a specified consequence of noncompliance, and fear-induced compliance all ... are essential.... The challenge under article I, section 8 [of the Oregon Constitution, guaranteeing free speech] therefore cannot be dismissed by saying simply that the statute forbids an "act" rather than "speech." That distinction could be helpful if a law proscribed threatening gestures or other intimidating acts, or if it became necessary to differentiate between the communicative content and the noncommunicative means of proscribed expression. But speech often would be the offender's only act in committing this crime. Indeed, the statute leaves it immaterial whether an accused or another person had either the intent or the capacity to carry out the threatened consequences; a successful bluff seems to suffice.
State v. Robertson, 293 Or. 402, 416, 649 P.2d 569, 578 (1982).
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