What is the current state of the law regarding plea agreements?

We have recognized as a general principle, however, that plea agreements are contractual in nature and that any dispute over their terms will be determined by contract-law standards. See, e.g., United States v. Read, 778 F.2d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Krasn, 614 F.2d 1229, 1233 (9th Cir.1980). In resolving disputes, we have also stated that courts must first determine "what the parties to the plea bargain reasonably understood to be the terms of agreement." United States v. Read, 778 F.2d at 1441 (quoting United States v. Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir.1979)). Although these principles presuppose the existence of a plea agreement, the overarching principle from which these principles are derived is that plea agreements are contractual in nature. Any contract defense should be available to the government or defendant, including a defense based on a unilateral mistake. The idea that plea agreements should be governed by the standards of contract law is not simply an "analogy" which the majority may dismiss as "imperfect" when it does not support the result they desire to reach, but rather a principle of law that must be confronted.