What is the current state of the law on a requirement that a plaintiff must be a "catalyst" for the disclosure of information under the Freedom of Information Act?

⁹ Only one court seems to have entertained the notion that the statute, read plainly, does not include a causation requirement. See Sai v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 155 F.Supp.3d 1, 6 n.4 (D.D.C. 2016) ("[U]nder the literal terms of the statute, a plaintiff need only show that the agency has changed its position and that the plaintiff's claim was not insubstantial. "). Sai then noted the legislative history discussed above, which it believed counseled in favor of such a requirement. Because causation was "likely a non-issue" in that case, however, it did not discuss the question further. Id.

¹⁰ As a practical matter, where there is litigation pending and the basis for the release of information is substantial, I suspect instances in which the information is released for reasons entirely independent of the litigation are likely rare. The old catalyst theory, after all, required only a "substantial causative effect," not that the lawsuit be the sole or determinant cause of disclosure. Cf. ACLU v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 810 F.Supp.2d 267, 274 (D.D.C. 2011) (finding that the litigation "substantially caused" the release of some documents even though others were released in the course of defendant's administrative response).