What is the current state of the law in the context of qualified immunity from prosecution in civil cases?

194, 200-201, overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan (2009) 555 U.S. 223, 227.) "The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. [Citation.]" (Saucier v. Katz, supra, at p. 202.)

"Since public officials exercising discretionary powers may sometimes abuse their discretion, the immunity is qualified, rather than absolute, so that civil damages can serve as a restraint. At the same time, the immunity incorporates a recognition that 'claims frequently run against the innocent as well as the guiltyat a cost not only to the defendant officials, but to society as a whole.' [Citation.] While unproductive societal costs may be unavoidable in a system that relies on private litigation as one means to enforce our constitutional norms, the aim of qualified immunity is to limit those costs to the greatest practical degree. We do not want to let the threat of litigation and personal liability 'deter[] . . . able citizens from acceptance of public office[,]' nor do we want to 'dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible public officials, in the unflinching discharge of their duties.' [Citation.] Hence, '[t]his immunity is broad in scope and protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."' [Citations.]" (Curley v. Klem (3d Cir. 2007) 499 F.3d 199, 206.)