What is the appropriate sanction for destruction of evidence by police?

It is well established that "due process requires in an appropriate case that an accused, upon timely request therefor, be afforded a pretrial lineup in which witnesses to the alleged criminal conduct can participate." (Evans v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 617, 625, 114 Cal.Rptr. 121, 522 P.2d 681.) Here appellant was afforded his due process right to a pretrial lineup; the question arises as to what sanction was appropriate when certain witnesses failed to attend the court-ordered lineup. As the court noted in Evans, when a defendant is denied his right of discovery, the net effect is the same as if existing evidence were intentionally suppressed. (Id. at p. 625, 114 Cal.Rptr. 121, 522 P.2d 681.)

[219 Cal.App.3d 1385] "[T]he courts enjoy a large measure of discretion in determining the appropriate sanction that should be imposed because of the destruction of discoverable records and evidence." (People v. Zamora (1980) 28 Cal.3d 88, 99, 167 Cal.Rptr. 573, 615 P.2d 1361.) Factors to consider in making such a decision include whether the evidence was lost through bad faith destruction or through a proper and innocent act; whether the evidence could conclusively demonstrate innocence, or whether it merely impeaches a witness or is even immaterial; and what impact the sanction will have upon future cases and future police conduct. (Id. at pp. 100-101, 167 Cal.Rptr. 573, 615 P.2d 1361.) The public interest in law enforcement must also be considered in evaluating the appropriateness of a particular sanction. (Id. at p. 100, 167 Cal.Rptr. 573, 615 P.2d 1361.)