What if the jury had been instructed not to consider the word "narcotics activity" in their assessment of evidence at trial?

"narcotics activity" would have affected the jury's assessment of the evidence and these arguments. The testimony in question was brief, the trial court admonished the jury to consider it only for the limited purpose of understanding why officers approached Aruizu, it was not mentioned in closing arguments, and it did not bear directly on the primary disputed issuenarcotics salesin any event. Simple possession of methamphetamine is "narcotics activity"; a reasonable jury would not have interpreted the phrase as requiring sales. Moreover, ample evidence supported the finding that Aruizu possessed methamphetamine for sale, rather than personal use. Under these circumstances, Aruizu has not shown any reasonable probability, i.e., any reasonable chance, that he would have obtained a more favorable outcome if the testimony regarding "narcotics activity" had not been admitted. (See People v. Lucero (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1110 [similar error held harmless where court admonished jury, the evidence was not critical, and it was mentioned only briefly in closing arguments].)

Aruizu claims the court's jury instruction was insufficient to cure any prejudice because it did not specifically tell the jury not to consider the testimony when deciding whether Aruizu possessed methamphetamine with intent to sell. We disagree. The instruction told the jury to consider the testimony "for only one purpose and that is the purpose as to why the officers approached the [d]efendant and for no other purpose." The jury could not reasonably interpret this instruction as allowing it to consider the testimony for purposes other than why the officers approached Aruizu. We presume the jury understood and followed this instruction. (See People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 139.) Aruizu has provided no reason to abandon this presumption here.

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