What constitutes a course of conduct under the stalking statute?

Defendant here, somewhat novelly, argues precisely the opposite: that the period of time was too long and the conduct too infrequent to constitute a course of conduct. He relies on People v. Venson, Misc.3d , 2015 WL 753338 (App. Term 1st Dept.2015), also a stalking case. There, the defendant gave the complainant, who was his neighbor, two gifts of common household items, which were not unwelcome. The first was one month after they met and the second was some three months after the first. Id. Eighteen months later, the defendant followed the defendant into her laundry room and asked her to remove her television from her window because it was keeping him awake, at which point the complainant told the defendant to leave her alone. Id. That same month, the complainant learned of the existence of nude pictures that the defendant had taken of her; defendant told the police that he was planning to show them to the complainant's co-op board as proof she was enticing him. Id. The Appellate Term dismissed, concluding that the infrequent and temporally diffuse contact with the complainant that defendant allegedly initiated, spread out over a period spanning nearly two years, did not make out a course of conduct' as that term is used in the statute, viz., a series of acts evidencing a continuity of purpose.' Id.