What are the consequences of a dismissal pursuant to section 1381.5 of the California Penal Code?

2 Consequences of a dismissal pursuant to section 1381 are summarized in People v. Manina (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 896, 120 Cal.Rptr. 51: "Such a dismissal, where the charge is a felony, is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense; it is res judicata of none of the issues of the action, and the defendant has not suffered prior jeopardy as a result. [Citations.] Nor does such a dismissal necessarily determine that the defendant has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. For such a conclusion would be wholly inconsistent with section 1387 permitting refiling and prosecution of the same charge. [p] Nevertheless, a failure to bring such an incarcerated defendant to trial followed by a dismissal of the action in accordance with section 1381, constitutes prima facie evidence of the denial of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. [Citation.] And while, as indicated, Penal Code section 1387 permits the prosecutor to refile the same charge, the defendant may thereafter urge that he has been denied a speedy trial on the charge. The burden then rests upon the prosecutor to establish good cause for the delay. Upon his failure to do so the action must again, and finally, be dismissed. [Citations.]" (Pp. 899-900, 120 Cal.Rptr. 51, fn. omitted.) Manina has been held applicable to section 1381.5. (In re Shute (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 543, 551, 130 Cal.Rptr. 270.)

3 The People also contend the letter fails to comply with the statute because it is addressed to the prosecuting attorney at the municipal court. The argument is unavailing. The prosecutor admitted receiving the letter. Section 1381.5 does not specify the manner in which the request for trial is to be addressed; all that is required is that the district attorney receive the request. (See Reynolds v. Superior Court, supra, 113 Cal.App.3d at p. 513, 169 Cal.Rptr. 868.)