The following excerpt is from People v. Brown, 594 N.Y.S.2d 696, 610 N.E.2d 369, 80 N.Y.2d 729 (N.Y. 1993):
We decline to adopt the "equally percipient witness" limitation on the present sense impression exception rule as urged by defendant. Insisting that the declarant's descriptions of the events must be corroborated in court by a witness who was present with the declarant and who observed the very same events would deprive the exception of most, if not all, of its usefulness. If such an eyewitness is available to testify to the events, there is certainly no pressing need for the hearsay testimony. And excluding the statement of the declarant in all cases when such eyewitness is not available may bar the fact finder from hearing relevant testimony that is perfectly reliable. Nor do we agree with defendant that, at a minimum, there must be a corroborating witness who--although not necessarily percipient of all that declarant observed--did at least simultaneously see or hear some aspect of it (see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Coleman,
Page 701
The above passage should not be considered legal advice. Reliable answers to complex legal questions require comprehensive research memos. To learn more visit www.alexi.com.