A difficulty in this case is in identifying the need relied upon as engaging the Grievor’s legal obligation towards his parents. There were times the Grievor appeared to be asserting that the need in question was an obligation to personally administer to his parents. While I accept that this would be preferable from the perspective of the Grievor and his parents, the personal performance of filial duties does not rise to the level of a legal responsibility. It is “preference”, not a “requirement”: see Devany v. ZRV Holdings Ltd., 2012 HRTO 1590 at para 117. However, there were also times that the Grievor appeared to be asserting that the need in question was ensuring the provision of food, medication and the like to his parents. I have no difficulty in concluding that these needs would arise from the legal obligation to provide the necessaries of life as opposed to personal choices. Given this, I turn to consider the third factor in the Johnstone analysis. The Third Factor: has the Union established that the Grievor has made reasonable efforts to meet those eldercare obligations through reasonable alternative solutions, and that no such alternative solution is reasonably accessible?
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