What factors will the Court consider when determining whether an individual is a Convention refugee from Sri Lanka?

Two recent cases in this court have dealt with the appropriate factors to be taken into account. In Rajudeen v. M.E.I. (1984), 55 N.R. 129, the court held that although the evidence established that the mistreatment of the applicant had been carried out by thugs of the Sri Lanka majority and not by government authorities or by the police, the police took no active steps to stop the mistreatment. The applicant had therefore established ample justification for being unwilling to avail himself of the protection of Sri Lanka so that the had satisfied the definition of Convention refugee. In a concurring opinion, Stone J.A. had this to say in Rajudeen v. M.E.I., at p. 135: Obviously, an individual cannot be considered a "Convention refugee" only because he has suffered in his homeland from the outrageous behaviour of his fellow citizens. To my mind, in order to satisfy the definition the persecution complained of must have been committed or been condoned by the state itself and consist either of conduct directed by the state toward the individual or in it knowlingly tolerating the behaviour of private citizens, or refusing or being unable to protect the individual from such behaviour. The respondent contends that no persecution occurred in this case because the treatment complained of was visited upon the applicant by bands of thugs operating outside the law rather than by the state itself. It pointed to some evidence which it claimed as establishing that the state indeed frowned upon the sort of behaviour that is in question and had provided a means of redress in the courts of Sri Lanka. But I think we must look at what actually occurred. It is true that the acts complained of were not committed by the state or its agents. On the other hand, a consideration of the evidence as a whole convinces me that the police were either unable or, worse still, unwilling to effectively protect the applicant against the attacks made upon him. Accordingly, because of his race and religion, the applicant could not reasonably expect to be protected by an important state agency against unlawful attacks. In my view, he had good reason to be fearful and, objectively, such fear was well-founded.