What remedies are available to a judge who finds counsel in breach of the principle of leading a party to lead contradictory evidence?

A breach of that principle might occur either because counsel chose to do it deliberately or inadvertently through ignorance of its content and purpose. In either case, if the judge does invoke the principle, the second question affords various answers to address the breach. These lie within the discretion of the judge and should be the subject of representations by counsel. One possibility is to recall the witness for cross-examination (or further cross-examination). The judge has no obligation to suggest this remedy, or to recall the witness, although such a suggestion is commonly made. A second is to admit some or all of the evidence tendered in breach and thereafter ensure that the trier of fact is specifically instructed that in assessing the whole of the evidence careful consideration should be given to the probative value of any testimony on both sides that is concerned with the breach. A third option is to enforce the principle in Browne v. Dunn by disallowing the party in breach to lead contradictory evidence. [footnotes omitted]