Does retaliation not have to be the only reason for an employer's decision to dismiss a human rights complaint?

A useful elaboration on the rule that a discriminatory consideration (including retaliation with respect to a human rights complaint) does not have to be the only reason for an employer decision in order for an [sic] complainant to obtain relief, may be found in Almeida v. Chubb Fire Security Div. (1984), 1984 CanLII 5036 (ON HRT), 5 C.H.R.R. D/2104 at § 17841 (emphasis added): . . . it is sufficient for a complainant to establish that the prohibited ground of discrimination constituted only one among a number of factors leading to the decisions which are the subject matter of the complaint . . . although the prohibited ground of decision-making must have some causal role or influence in the decision made, it need not be the exclusive cause of or influence on the decision. Indeed . . . it is not necessary to establish that the prohibited ground was the main reason for the decision in question.