As said before, here there was no express release of the easement. Moreover, when we consider the law, there is no inference that can be drawn that because an alternate means of access was provided that this would extinguish the right of way. This is especially so when, as said before, part of the right of way has been extinguished by a specific grant. Indeed, the alternative inference seems more likely that since the disputed right of way was not included in the deed releasing the other right of way that no intention to extinguish existed. Moreover, there is nothing in the original grant that allows that this right of way may be extinguished by giving an alternate access and egress: (See:Giecewicz v. Alexander, op. cit.) In addition, with respect to the Bost case supra, it is clear on the facts (page four of that decision), to paraphrase, that the party benefiting from the right of way and bringing the litigation had conveyed away part of the property and, therefore, there was a gap in the right of way. It seems this, in and of itself, would be enough to extinguish the right of way without going on to decide whether the right of way had been extinguished by an alternate mode of access. This is because the beneficiary has voluntarily nullified its use.
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