What is the test for unjust enrichment in real estate?

Counsel has referred me to a number or cases which have applied the principles laid down in Becker v. Pettkus, 1980 CanLII 22 (SCC), [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834, 19 R.F.L. (2d) 165, 8 E.T.R. 143,117 D.L.R. (3d) 257, 34 N.R. 384. For those principles to apply there must be some form of unjust enrichment, i.e., “an enrichment, a corresponding deprivation and absence of any juristic reason for the enrichment”, per Dickson J. (as he then was) at p. 180. In my view the evidence here discloses that the respondent was not in this sense unjustly enriched by any action of the petitioner. I find he was repaid for all moneys he advanced, either in cash or by credit against a fair sharing of expenses. I find the respondent fully accounted to the petitioner in this respect. Furthermore the petitioner was repaid for all materials he purchased in the course of work he did about the house. I find finally that what labour the petitioner expended, mostly done in the early months of his occupation of Duchess Avenue, was not done in the reasonable expectation of receiving any interest in the property and was not cumulatively sufficient to warrant the finding that the respondent had thereby been unjustly enriched. As I say, it was the sort of handyman work that one would expect a man in these circumstances to do about the house. The petitioner’s claim is accordingly dismissed with costs. The respondent’s counterclaim for an interest in the petitioner’s property, which was not seriously pursued at trial, should also be dismissed.