Does the Attorney General argue that the terms of a personal protection order do not infringe the privacy of the Respondent's right to liberty or security of the person?

71 The Attorney General argues that the terms of this particular order do not infringe the respondent’s rights to liberty or security of the person. This order was very narrowly drafted and the respondent’s freedom of movement was only minimally restrained by the terms of the protection order. He could not follow the applicant from place to place, he could not go to her residence and he could not communicate with her directly or indirectly. He could not, in effect, “beset” her. It seems unlikely that such terms could prevent a person from participating fully in a community’s activities, even in a small community. He maintained the right to move freely in society. Such prohibitions constitute such a trivial infringement, especially considering the concerns of the applicant, that it cannot be said to be a sufficiently serious infringement to warrant Charter protection. “The Charter does not protect against insignificant or ‘trivial’ limitations of rights: ….” See Cunningham v. Canada, 1993 CanLII 139 (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 143 at 151.