What are the principles applicable on an interim motion for spousal support?

At ¶ 14 of Politis v. Politis, 2015 ONSC 5997, Harvison Young J. (as she then was) summarized certain principles applicable on an interim motion for spousal support. She wrote: 1. On applications for interim support the applicant's needs and the respondent's ability to pay assume greater significance; 2. An interim support order should be sufficient to allow the applicant to continue living at the same standard of living enjoyed prior to separation if the payor's ability to pay warrants it; 3. On interim support applications the court does not embark on an in-depth analysis of the parties' circumstances which is better left to trial. The court achieves rough justice at best; 4. The courts should not unduly emphasize any one of the statutory considerations above others; 5. On interim applications the need to achieve economic self-sufficiency is often of less significance; 6. Interim support should be ordered within the range suggested by the SSAGs unless exceptional circumstances indicate otherwise; 7. Interim support should only be ordered where it can be said a prima facie case for entitlement has been made out; and 8. Where there is a need to resolve contested issues of fact, especially those connected with a threshold issue, such as entitlement, it becomes less advisable to order interim support.

All of these factors from Politis v. Politis were not specifically referred to by counsel during submissions, although counsel did argue some of them. Not all of the principles needed to be argued. For example, the issue of entitlement is conceded. In this decision, I am focusing on the contested issues. But I note two things in particular.