How has the defence of “fair comment” been interpreted?

I repeat here what I have already said several times, that this plea of fair comment is very different from one of justification. If any of the allegations made in these articles are in themselves libellous, the defendants say, by this plea, that the libel is contained, not in the facts stated, because they are merely a true narrative of an affair of public interest, but in the comment; and they proceed to say that they do not assert that the words used in expressing the comment are literally true, but that they are a fair inference from the facts, an inference they must be excused from having drawn on account of the existence of such facts. A plea of justification says that the words are true, that is, all the words, not only those which express facts but those also which express comment. For instance, if the defendants had pleaded justification they would have undertaken to prove literally that the plaintiffs’ remissness of which they complain in the article of April 9, 1924, was “not without promise of valuable consideration,” that is that he was really acting in expectation of reward from the law-breakers; although it is admitted that these words are used in the article as comment only. By pleading fair comment they do not assert that all the words are true, but only those which set out the facts under discussion. As for the other words, those which express comment, they say that they are not obliged to prove their literal truth and do not undertake to do so, but that they were justified in imputing bad faith to the plaintiff, because the matter was one of public interest and the facts were such that a reasonable and fair-minded person could legitimately conclude from what was going on that the plaintiff must indeed have been in expectation of a bribe. It may be well to add here another authority to those I have already cited. Lord Finlay says, in Sutherland v. Stapes, supra (at p. 62) : The defendant who raises this defence [fair comment] does not take upon himself the burden of showing that the comments are true. If the facts are truly stated with regard to a matter of public interest, the defendant will succeed in his defence to an action of libel, if the jury are satisfied that the comments are fairly and honestly made.

Of course a defendant who has commented upon a matter of public interest may enter a plea of justification, thus waiving the benefit of the public occasion and undertaking the heavier task of proving the truth of all his defamatory words, after furnishing particulars, if required, of the facts on which he relies. And justification, if asserted and proved will, of course, be a complete answer to any demand for damages in the case of any libel. Or he may plead justification and fair comment alternatively, and failing on the first succeed on the second, as was pointed out in Dakhyl v. Labouchere, supra.